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Economic sanctions, in the sense of the withdrawal or 
threatened withdrawal of trade or financial relations are 
imposed on a targeted country by other states or groups of 
states for the purpose of achieving foreign policy goals. 
According to Hufbauer et al. (2007), economic sanctions have 
been used increasingly frequently over the past century. In 
particular since the end of the Cold War, the international 
community has often imposed economic sanctions to curb the 
spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and to cease 
supporting terrorism. Reynolds and Wan (2012) report that the 
international community introduced as many as 256 sanctions 
measures for these purposes on Iran, Iraq, Libya, and the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (hereinafter DPRK or 
North Korea) between 1990 and 2009, and that each target 
nation responded differently. This paper aims to compare the 
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DPRK’s and Libya’s contrasting decision-making in response 
to economic sanctions. It explains why one country continued 
to pursue nuclear tests, while the other reversed both its 
support for terrorism and its nuclear programs. Why did they 
decide to go in opposite directions? This paper presents a 
model based on the reference point effects of prospect theory, 
and applies the model to analyze the cases of the DPRK and 
Libya.  
 
1. Reference Point Matters for a Sanction Target’s Deci-
sion-making 
 
1.1. Prospect Theory 
The agents in prospect theory are similar to those in the 
mainstream expected utility theory, in the sense that they 
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assess utility through the arithmetic operation of value and 
probability. The difference is that agents in expected utility 
theory measure utility on the basis of objective values and 
probability, while those in prospect theory use subjective 
values and probability. There is nothing new to the premise 
that humans base their decision-making on subjective 
judgments. The innovative contribution of Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) was to identify regularity in the subjective 
judgments of agents, and define it through a value function 
and a probability weighting function, corresponding to a utility 
function in mainstream economics.1 
In particular, the value function of prospect theory posits that 
people evaluate values in relation to a reference point 
(hereinafter RP). Suppose that last year A and B earned 
$30,000 and $50,000 respectively. The theory argues that if 
they both receive $40,000 this year, A will be happier than B. 
This is due to the comparison with the previous year: A gains 
$10,000, while B loses $10,000. In other words, value is 
assessed in relation to last year’s salary as a RP. Humans are 
more sensitive to negative (-) than positive (+) change relative 
to RP: people are more concerned about the $10 they lose 
 
1 Kahneman was awarded the Nobel Prize in Eco-
nomics in 2002 for his pioneering work on deci-
sion-making and uncertainty (prospect theory), 
which was developed with Tversky. 
than the $10 they find by happenstance on the street. Further, 
Kahneman and Tversky argue that people prefer to choose 
(4000, 0.25; 2000, 0.25) to (6000, 0.25), but (-6000, 0.25) 
to (-4000, 0.25; -2000, 0.25).2 These preferences ensue from 
the value function, where the slope for losses is steeper than 
for gains, relative to the reference (see Figure 1). Thus, people 
respond more sensitively to change near the RP than to change 
in the region further away from it. This effect is called 
“diminishing sensitivity. 
According to prospect theory, the reference point (RP), 
defined as a circumstance or condition against which to 
compare choices, has a crucial influence on people’s decision-
making.  
Prospect theory basically analyzes individual choices about 
economic issues. For this very reason, Boettcher (1995) 
argued that the theory has limitations in terms of examining 
national choices about political matters. Nevertheless, many 
international political scientists have analyzed states’ 
decision-making using prospect theory. Jervis (1994, 23–38) 
and Levy (1994, 139–40) argued that prospect theory could 
be a useful tool in analyzing a state’s foreign policy decisions 
through the concept of loss aversion, by 
which a state would react more 
sensitively to loss than gain based on its 
current situation (this is known as the 
reference point).3  Such discussions can 
provide a useful analytical framework 
for studying why a country would 
declare or participate in a war that it has 
an extremely low probability of winning. 
For example, Park (2004) analyzed 
Iraq’s economic situation in 1990 
based on the RP at which Iraq, during 
the Gulf War, decided not to surrender 
to U.S. attacks and take part in the war 
instead. In other words, taking the 
economic crisis at the time as its RP, 
2 (6000, 0.25) refers to a 25 percent chance to 
win $6,000. (2000, 0.25; 4000, 0.25) means a 
25 percent chance to win $2,000 or a 25 percent 
chance to win $4,000. It is the same for the case 
of (-). 
3 According to Levy (1994), a “risky option” is one 
that includes uncertainty (that is, the probability); 
here the RP is the standard of judgment for all 
gains and losses. 
 
Figure 1: The value function 
 
Source: Kahneman and Tversky (1979), 279. 
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Iraq chose the risk-seeking option of war in order to prevent a 
severe worsening, which was a definite loss with a high 
probability. McDermott (1998) analyzed President Jimmy 
Carter’s decision to send military forces to rescue American 
hostages in Iran based on prospect theory. The economic 
situation in 1979, when the embassy hostage crisis occurred, 
was extremely poor and support for the Carter Administration 
was falling sharply. Under such circumstances, Carter could 
not sit by and watch the inevitable drop in his approval ratings; 
instead, he chose the policy of using force against Iran despite 
the possible low probability of winning. 
Prior research has successfully identified the central 
implication of the theory, which is that “circumstances and 
contexts need to be considered in the analysis of the decision” 
(Hwang 2005; see also McDermott 2004). In this regard, 
prospect theory provides key tools for analyzing foreign 
policies. According to the literature, a state’s domestic and 
international circumstances can be taken as the RP for 
decision-making in response to economic sanctions 
(McDermott 2004, 289–312; also Farnham 1994, 41–71; 
Park 2004). 
1.2. Reference Point Effects on a Target’s Decision-making 
As Figure 2 shows, the sender imposes economic sanctions 
to pressure the target into compliance with particular 
diplomatic demands. The target has the binary option of 
backing down or standing firm. If it backs down, the two parties 
reach a settlement and the game is over. On the other hand, if 
the target stands firm, the sender must choose between 
withdrawing or maintaining the sanctions. If the sender lifts the 
sanctions, the target returns to the prior status quo without 
sanctions; however, if the sender keeps the sanctions in place, 
the target ends up in a contest with the sender. Consequently, 
the target anticipates either “a win” or “a loss” as the ultimate 
consequence of the economic sanctions. The target will 
presumably make its decision by comparing the expected 
utilities among the three possible options of settlement, status 
quo, and contest. The assumption of this paper, however, is 
that when economic sanctions are issued the target does not 
expect the status quo to continue. In other words, the target 
does not anticipate the sender’s acceptance of its resistance 
against the incurred sanctions. The reasoning is as follows: the 
sender would not have initiated the economic sanctions in the 
Figure 2: Target’s options in response to economic sanctions 
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first place if the target could have expected the sender to 
accept its resistance to the demands (which would inevitably 
lead the target to choose to stand firm unconditionally. Thus, 
if sanctions are enforced they can be expected to be reliable, 
and the target will have to decide whether to stand firm or to 
relent based on a comparison between the respective 
expected utilities of the two options. 
Considering that prospect theory also analyzes a target’s 
decision-making in response to economic sanctions through 
the boundary point, s*, where the preference of choice is 
indifferent because the utilities of the two options of settlement 
and contest are equal, it does not differ from the framework of 
expected utility theory.I What creates a distinction between the 
two is that prospect theory identifies s* by setting an RP, R 
(0≤R≤1), and the probability level to calculate the utility of 
each outcome. The expected utilities of settlement and contest 
can be derived by the RP and the probability level proposed by 
prospect theory.II  
In other words, the higher the RP is, the higher the boundary 
point (s*) would be. As explained earlier, a high boundary point 
implies low effectiveness of economic sanctions, which 
manifests in the target’s strong resistance. In conclusion, the 
utility function proposed by prospect theory shows that as the 
RP increases, a target can be expected to decide to stand 
firmer against the sender’s demands.4 
 
4 In fact, s*' = 1-{[(1/λ)(1-c-R)^β + 
(R+c)^β)]^(1/β-1)}×{(1/λ)[(1-c-R)^(β-1)] + 
(R+c)^(β-1)}×{[1/(e^((-ln(1/p)^(-
2. The North Korean Case 
2.1. The Chronology of Pyongyang’s Decision to “Go Nu-
clear” in Response to Economic Sanctions 
North Korea’s nuclear activities came to the international 
community’s attention in September 1989, following the 
release of photographs of the Yongbyon area taken by a French 
commercial satellite. The International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) requested a visit to these undeclared facilities in 1992. 
On March 16, 1994, the IAEA declared that it could not verify 
that no reprocessing activities had occurred at the 
Radiochemical Laboratory, since it had not been able to 
complete a full inspection. In response, North Korea stopped 
operating its 5 MW nuclear reactor in April 1994, and started 
to withdraw spent fuel rods on May 4, 1994. The IAEA 
conducted another inspection on May 17, 1994, but North 
Korea refused to allow the collection of a spent fuel sample, 
which made it impossible for the inspectors to assess past 
nuclear activity. The United States finally abandoned talks and 
proceeded to impose economic sanctions on North Korea. On 
June 3, 1994, a joint statement by the Republic of Korea 
(South Korea), the United States, and Japan announced 
economic sanctions on North Korea. The U.S.-led sanctions 
included halting development aid, a ban on sports, cultural, 
and scientific exchanges and support, and an arms embargo. 
The statement also threatened harsher measures affecting 
1))^α))]^(1/β)}) > 0 can also imply a positive cor-
relation between s* and R. 
Figure 3: Reference point effects on the target’s decision 
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trade and financial transactions if North Korea rejected a 
special IAEA inspection. As economic sanctions became 
reality, North Korea weakened its hostile behavior; it continued 
to condemn the United States but at the same time stressed 
the necessity of negotiations (Rodong Shinmun 1994a, 
1994b, 1994c). This conflict was temporarily settled with the 
Agreed Framework of 1994.  
The North Korean nuclear crisis resumed in the early 2000s, 
when it admitted possession of highly enriched uranium (HEU) 
development plants. In response the administration of 
President George W. Bush immediately supplying heavy oil, 
demanded that doubts over HEU development be cleared in 
the short term, and sought complete, verifiable, and 
irrevocable nuclear disarmament in the long term. North Korea 
strongly condemned the United States for imposing sanctions 
and blamed it for breaking the Agreed Framework. In 
resistance to the U.S. economic sanctions, North Korea lifted 
its nuclear freeze on December 12, removed the surveillance 
camera for the sealed 5 MW reactor on December 22, expelled 
the IAEA inspectors on December 31, and announced its 
withdrawal Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty in January 2003, 
while condemning the sanctions as an excuse for an invasion 
to serve the “dirty political purpose” of “imperialists” (Rodong 
Shinmun 2003). On November 26, 2004, seeing no signs of 
a resolution to the North Korean nuclear issue, the U.S. opted 
for a year-long suspension of the KEDO light-water reactor 
(LWR) project. On February 10, 2005, North Korea declared its 
possession of nuclear weapons. The September 19 Joint 
Statement was drawn up in September 2005, during the 
second phase of the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks, but 
Figure 4: Reference point effects and the DPRK’s value function under sanctions 
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subsequent in-depth action plans were interrupted by a motion 
for economic sanctions against North Korea by the U.S. 
Treasury (Haggard and Noland 2012, 250–58). Sanctions 
through the Banco Delta Asia in Macau resulted in a long-term 
freeze on North Korea’s overseas funds, and the nuclear issue 
reached a deadlock. Finally, on October 9, 2006, North Korea 
conducted its first nuclear weapon test. 
Whereas Pyongyang responded to the U.S.-led economic 
sanctions in the early 1990s by entering into the Agreed 
Framework, in the 2000s it responded by conducting a nuclear 
test. Plainly, North Korea demonstrated stronger resistance in 
the second crisis than in the first. 
 
2.2. Why the DPRK Decided to “Go Nuclear”: Pyongyang’s 
Increasing Reference Point 
Why did North Korea decide to pursue nuclear technologies 
despite facing such severe economic sanctions? The reason 
can be argued in terms of RP effects: Pyongyang’s RP had 
increased; therefore, North Korea could go nuclear.  
According to the value function proposed by prospect theory 
(see Figure 4), if the RP increases from R0 to R' and this is 
accompanied by shifts in the value of the expected results in 
both the case where North Korea backs down and in the case 
where it stands firm, both values would result in decreases. 
In particular, the extent to which the value of the expected 
result decreases in the case where North Korea backs down 
and agrees to denuclearization is much greater than the 
decrease in the value of the expected result in the case where 
it stands firm. Thus, if the RP increased during the time of the 
second North Korean nuclear crisis, and consequently the 
utility of agreement decreased by a much greater extent than 
the decrease in the utility of confrontation (resistance to the 
economic sanctions), this could explain North Korea’s firmer 
resistance in the second case.  
As mentioned above, the domestic and international 
circumstances of North Korea need to be considered as 
indicators of its RP. Domestically, North Korea’s situation was 
seriously unstable during the early 1990s, its political stability 
having suffered a severe blow when the Soviet Union and 
 
5 Kim Il Sung, in private conversations with the East 
German defense minister later in July, declared that 
China, its two strongest allies since its establishment, opened 
diplomatic relations with South Korea. Moreover, this was the 
period immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
when formerly communist Eastern Europe turned to the market 
economy system. There was widespread external agreement 
that “North Korea’s collapse following Eastern Europe was 
unavoidable and was just a matter of time” (Gang 2002, 3). 
The political instability North Korea faced at the time is also 
reflected in its approach to inter-Korean relations: without 
domestic instability, North Korea had no reason to change its 
hostile stance toward South Korea to voluntary appeasement. 
Moreover, it is believed that this political insecurity motivated 
North Korea to seek regime stability through improved inter-
Korean relations. For instance, North Korea initially responded 
negatively to South Korean President Roh Tae-woo’s July 7 
Declaration of 1988, in which he announced a six-point 
program that included promotion of trade, exchanges of visits 
at all levels, and humanitarian contacts between the two 
Koreas, etc. (Oberdorfer 1997, 188–89),5 but later it changed 
its stance. During the Supreme People’s Assembly on May 24, 
1990, Kim Il-sung indicated his intention to improve relations 
with South Korea by announcing that North Korea could accept 
a “gradual” withdrawal of the U.S. military forces from the 
South, which was a change from his former demand of 
“immediate” withdrawal (Rodong Shinmun 1990).  
Furthermore, the economic situation in North Korea was also 
very unstable. The loss of its external markets following the 
collapse of the Communist Bloc greatly affected the North 
Korean economy. As the Soviet Union and China, which 
accounted for most of North Korean trade, began requiring 
payment in hard currency, its imports of raw materials 
plummeted and negative growth rates ensued (KIEP 2002). 
Economic growth was 1.4 percent in 1989, but fell into the 
negative range after 1990: -4.3 percent in 1990, -4.4 percent 
in 1991, and -7.1 percent in 1992 (UN Database). 
Considering that the only previous year of negative growth 
since the country’s founding was 1978, which was not long 
after the oil shock, these consecutive negative growth rates 
indicated that the North Korean economic situation was indeed 
Roh’s declaration was intended to permanently 
split the country up. 
IJCV: Vol. 11#01/2017 
Park: Why Targets of Economic Sanctions React Differently: Reference Point Effects on North Korea and Libya 7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
highly unstable (KINU 1993, 258). Moreover, for the first time 
in the regime’s history, North Korea had to admit the failure of 
its Economic Development Plan (the Third Seven-Year Plan, 
1987–1993; KCNA 1994, 168).  
By the 2000s, North Korea’s domestic and international 
situation had stabilized to some extent, particularly when 
compared to the early 1990s. Internally, the completion of Kim 
Jong-il’s succession may have relieved some of the domestic 
political insecurity. Following the death of Kim Il-sung in 1994, 
Kim Jong-il was nominated as General Secretary in October 
1997, and was re-nominated as the Chairman of the National 
Defense Commission (NDC) in September 1998. At the same 
time, Kim Jong-il carried out a constitutional reform to solidify 
his power. Under the new constitution, the powers of the NDC 
Chairman were no longer limited to controlling and leading the 
military forces and managing the nation’s overall national 
defense projects; now, the NDC Chairman could be viewed as 
the head of state. According to the Chairman of the Presidium 
of the Supreme People’s Assembly, the NDC Chairman was 
now the “top position of the state,” leading the state’s entire 
political, military, and economic capabilities, protecting the 
national system of the homeland as a socialist state and the 
destiny of its people, and also organizing and leading projects 
to strengthen and develop national defense and overall 
national power (Rodong Shinmun 1998). It was a “holy 
position” that symbolized and represented the state’s glory and 
the people’s dignity. Furthermore, the new constitution 
stipulated that the NDC was the organization responsible for 
the overall national defense management, and built the 
system through which NDC Chairman Kim Jong-il’s power could 
extend across the entire state (Suh 2000, 223).  
Additionally, the North Korean economic situation began to 
improve in the 2000s; economic growth was 0.4 percent in 
2000, 3.8 percent in 2001, 1.2 percent in 2002, 1.8 percent 
in 2003, and 3.8 percent in 2004 (UN Database). These 
positive growth rates meant that the economic situation had 
started to recover from a steep downturn, and it can be 
assumed that the economic instability at least partially 
alleviated. The food supply remained unstable, but shortages 
were reduced.  
Moreover, North Korea sought a way out of international 
isolation by improving relations with China. China in turn 
sought to expand its international influence by assuming the 
role of active mediator, in a change from its past stance over 
the North Korean nuclear issue (Jeon 2006, 265). Under this 
policy paradigm, frequent visits took place between the 
 
Figure 5: Reference point effects on the DPRK’s decision-making 
 
* R1: RP in the early 1990s / R2: RP around the 2000s 
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governments of China and North Korea (ibid.).6 Moreover, 
China continued to provide economic assistance in a variety of 
forms, despite the U.S. economic sanctions. For instance, after 
the imposition of economic sanctions in 2002, aid from China 
to North Korea amounted to $10,888,000 in 2003, 
$14,556,000 in 2004, $38,123,000 in 2005, and 
$37,360,000 in 2006 (Cho 2010, 4). 
It appears that around the 2000s, North Korea’s domestic 
and international situation had stabilized in comparison to the 
early 1990s. In other words, the RP of North Korea seems to 
have increased during the period of U.S. sanctions seeking to 
restrict North Korean nuclear nonactivities. According to the 
suggested model, Kim’s stronger resistance to sanctions could 
be explained by North Korea’s raised RP (see Figure 5). 
 
3. The Libyan Case 
 
3.1. The Chronology of Tripoli’s Decisions to Cease Support-
ing Terrorism and Forgo Nuclear Development in Response 
to Economic Sanctions: The Chronology 
After seizing power in 1969, Qaddafi began to seek nuclear 
weapons. In the 1970s, Libya attempted unsuccessfully to 
procure nuclear weapons from France, India, the Soviet Union, 
and even sources on the black market (Nuclear Threat 
Initiative). Libya’s nuclear efforts were frustrated by the 
reluctance on the part of most supplier countries to provide 
such assistance (Palkki and Smith 2012, 261). Qaddafi 
appeared to be implicated in several terrorist attacks against 
Western targets, such as the 1985 Rome and Vienna airport 
attacks, and the 1986 bombing of a discotheque in Berlin, 
which killed two U.S. servicemen. In response, President 
Reagan invoked the International Emergency Economic Powers 
Act to impose trade and financial controls against Libya in 
1986. He banned most exports and imports of goods, 
technology, and services, all loans or credits to the Libyan 
government, and transactions relating to travel to Libya by a 
U.S. citizen or permanent resident (Hufbauer et al. 2007, case 
78-8). Reagan also froze Libyan government assets in U.S. 
 
6 Such as the visit to North Korea by Wu Bangguo, 
Chairman of the Standing Committee of China’s 
National People’s Congress, in 2003; the visit to 
banks, including hundreds of millions of dollars of deposits 
held in foreign branches of American banks, as well as real 
estate and investments (Rose 1998, 129–56). Even under 
these severe sanctions, Libya nevertheless apparently 
continued to support international terrorism and was involved 
in overseas attacks until the mid-1990s. These included the 
1988 destruction of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, 
Scotland, which caused 270 casualties, including those of 
189 citizens. Evidence was also found linking Libya to 
international terrorists such as the heavily armed Palestinian 
terrorists captured off the coast of Israel, who claimed that they 
were trained in Libya, transported by Libyan vessels, and 
accompanied by Libyan advisors (ibid.).  
Libya’s nuclear weapons program became a serious issue for 
the international community from the 1990s. At this juncture 
it received a boost from A. Q. Khan and his global network of 
illicit suppliers, who provided Libya with key technologies such 
as centrifuge enrichment, weapons design, and engineering, 
as well as overseas training for Libyan personnel. In terms of 
terrorism and nuclear issues, sanctions were imposed under  
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions 748 
(1992) and 831 (1993), which entailed an arms embargo, air 
embargo, travel restrictions, petroleum-sector restrictions, and 
the freezing of Libya’s financial assets and funds. 
Complementing the sanctions through the UNSC Resolutions, 
Executive Order 12801 signed by President George H. W. Bush 
in 1992 prohibited access to U.S. airspace of any flights bound 
to or flying from Libya. The U.S. Congress also passed the 
controversial Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) in 1996 (updated 
in 2001). This legislation mandated sanctions against foreign 
firms with significant investment in Libya’s petroleum sectors. 
At the signing ceremony, Bush declared that ILSA “will help to 
deny (Iran and) Libya the money they need to finance 
terrorism, and it will limit the flow of resources necessary to 
obtain weapons of mass destruction” (Hufbauer et al. 2007, 
case 78-8). In response, starting from 1998, Libya ceased 
supporting terrorist acts, closed all terrorist training camps on 
Libyan soil, and expelled the Abu Nidal terrorist organization 
China by Kim Jong-il in 2004; the visit to North Ko-
rea by Li Changchun, member of Central Commit-
tee Politburo Standing Committee, in 2004; the 
visit to China by Kim Young-nam, Chairman of the 
Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly, in 
2004; the visit to North Korea by Hu Jintao, the for-
mer leader of China 2005; and the visit to China by 
Kim Jong-il in 2005. 
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(Lewis 2002). Qaddafi terminated his support for Hamas and 
Hezbollah in 1999, and surrendered two intelligence officers 
for trial by a Scottish tribunal in the Netherlands in connection 
with the Pan Am flight 103 attack (ibid.). Thereafter, Libya 
agreed to accept some responsibility for the Pan Am bombing 
in 2003. Finally, in the same year, Qaddafi also announced 
that Libya would “of its own free will” dismantle all of its WMD 
programs and abide by the NPT (Palkki and Smith 2012, 261). 
Thus, until the mid-1990s, Tripoli ignored U.S.-led economic 
sanctions, but from the mid-1990s responded with a reversal 
of its plans to continue terrorism and acquire nuclear weapons. 
Libya’s resistance to sanctions was weaker in the late 1990s 
than in the preceding period.  
  
3.2. Why Libya Decided to Cease Supporting Terrorism and 
Forgo Nuclear Weapons: Tripoli’s Decreasing Reference 
Point 
As mentioned in the North Korean case above, it is possible 
to discuss whether Tripoli’s RP had begun to decrease seriously 
after the mid-1990s, which would lead Qaddafi to cease terror 
and forgo nuclear weapons in face of U.S.-led economic 
sanctions.  
According to the value function proposed by prospect theory 
(see Figure 6), if the RP decreases from R' to R0 and this is 
accompanied by shifts in the value of the expected results in 
both the case where Libya backs down and the case where 
Libya stands firm, then consequently, both values would 
increase. In particular, the extent to which the value of the 
expected result increases in the case where Libya backs down 
Figure 6: Reference point effects and Libya’s value functions under sanctions
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and concedes to denuclearization would be much greater than 
the increase in the value of the expected result in the case 
where it stands firm. Thus, if the RP decreases, the utility of 
conceding to economic sanctions consequently increases by a 
much greater extent compared to the increase in the utility of 
confrontation by resistance to economic sanctions, and 
subsequently, Libya would have less reason to resist economic 
sanctions. 
In order to assess Libya ’s RP, its political and economic 
situation and international conditions need to be considered. 
Until the mid-1980s, Libyans enjoyed great improvements in 
housing and education, and comprehensive welfare and health 
services, which were all free of charge under Qaddafi’s policies. 
All of these were dependent on the continuous flow of oil rents 
based on Qaddafi’s Libyanization policy. However, the oil price 
collapse caused serious cash flow problems; oil revenues fell 
from $22 billion in 1980 to about $5 billion in 1986 (Altunisik 
1995, 87). Besides, poor economic performance during the 
1980s demonstrated clear deficiencies in the planned 
economic model of the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya. GDP growth fell from 8.3 percent in 1985 to -11.4 
percent in 1986, and -14.7 percent in 1987 (UN Database). 
To address the sudden recession, Qaddafi embarked on 
economic reform efforts from 1987. He introduced the concept 
of tashrukiyya, as a form of collective ownership that allowed 
partners to contribute labor and capital through the creation of 
cooperatives (Alafi and Bruijn 2010). Between 1987 and 
1989, the government passed a raft of new laws that allowed 
limited private sector investment for the first time since 1977. 
The Libyan economy appeared to gradually recover between 
1987 and 1990: GDP growth rose from -14.7 percent in 1987 
to 7.6 percent in 1988, and 7.2 percent in 1989 (UN 
Database). 
Despite Qaddafi’s efforts to overcome the “shortage 
economy” of the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 
external problems remained. The Libyan economy benefited 
from windfall profits resulting from the Gulf crisis in the early 
1990s. Later, however, it suffered the effects of fluctuating oil 
prices. The fact that there was no budget from April to 
December 1993 reflected the chaotic state of the economy. 
According to the governor of the central bank, the slump in the 
oil prices in 1993 meant that external earnings for the fiscal 
year ending March 31, 1993, were 13 percent less than the 
projected estimate (Altunisik 1995, 190). Increasing imports 
also contributed to inflation and budget deficits. In the 
meantime, the regime sought to secure sufficient financial 
reserves to withstand these difficult times.  
Along with the economic instability of the mid-1990s, 
Qaddafi also faced political instability within his core base. 
First of all, there were several reports of a mutiny at a military 
base that later spread to the nearby town of Misratah, where 
local civilians also joined the uprising. Although it was hard to 
determine the truth of these reports, Qaddafi’s subsequent 
speeches contained several confirmatory indications. For 
example, he praised the alertness and perceptiveness of the 
citizens of Misratah and spoke about the fact that the people 
had rejected the traitors (ibid., 212). Secondly, the regime 
continued to face challenges from Islamist groups, and 
Qaddafi no longer had sufficient political power to ignore these 
voices. In 1993, the state adopted coercive policies to 
appease its religious opponents.Thirdly, clear signs of tensions 
within the elite groups began to appear. For example, relations 
between Qaddafi and Abdessalam Jalloud, who was his close 
partner in leading the Libyan Revolution, became increasingly 
strained. Jalloud publicly rejected Qaddafi’s proposal to 
distribute half of the oil revenues in March 1993 and said that 
this idea was unpatriotic, destructive, and exceeded 
selfishness (ibid., 212–13). Another former Revolution 
Command Council member, Abu-Bakr also overturned 
Qaddafi’s decision to retire 2,500 army officers (ibid.). It could 
be said that these struggles were expected to heighten and 
that conflicts over distribution would deepen. Indeed, with 
increased political instability, the Libyan economy became 
seriously unstable again; per capita GDP fell from $8,081 in 
1992 to $4,032 in 2002 (UN Database).  
Moreover, the changing world order in the 1990s reminded 
Libya of its international isolation. Qaddafi’s relations with his 
neighbors were strained in the 1980s over issues such as 
unpaid salaries for Tunisian workers and a border clash with 
the Egyptians. Until the mid-1990s, such issues in Libya had 
been more regional in character and for which Qaddafi had 
secured support from his socialist allies. However, from the 
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mid-1990s, the Libyan issues turned international in character 
as Libya faced continuous threats from the United States 
regarding its terrorism and nuclear program; and since aid from 
his allies had dried up, Qaddafi had to face the increased 
intensity of these international threats alone. After the 
September 11 attacks, President George W. Bush identified 
WMDs as the “gravest danger” (Palkki and Smith 2012, 268). 
U.S. leaders made the case for war against Iraq during 2002–
2003 based largely on Iraq’s suspected nuclear program. As 
the United States was moving its forces into the Middle East to 
follow through on its threats against Saddam Hussein, Libya 
ultimately could not escape from being surrounded by 
international inspections.  
Libya’s domestic and international situation seems to have 
become more unstable after the mid-1990s. Its RP appears to 
have decreased during the period of U.S. sanctions. According 
to the proposed model, it could be said that the decreased RP 
led to Qaddafi’s weaker resistance in response to the 
economic sanctions (see Figure 7). 
 
4. Alternative Discussions 
Although this paper discusses the change in a target 
country’s response to sanctions followed by a change in its RP, 
it additionally introduces two alternative discussions that could 
explain the behavior of North Korea and Libya.  
First, the differing decisions made by North Korea and Libya 
in face of the second set of sanctions may have been because 
the former had very hostile relations with the United States, 
while the latter’s were relatively amicable. From 2001 the Bush 
administration completely reexamined the Clinton 
administration’s policy of engagement with North Korea and 
set a hardline policy course, which emphasized strict 
reciprocity and verification (Pritchard 2007). North Korea 
showed strong resistance to the hardline U.S. policies and 
criticized the Bush administration for establishing its missile 
defense system and delaying the KEDO LWR project, and 
threatened to resume missile tests (KCNA 2001). Meanwhile, 
after the September 11 terrorist attacks, the United States was 
focused on antiterrorism and nonproliferation of WMDs at a 
global level. In this context, the United States labelled North 
Korea as part of an “axis of evil” and U.S.-DPRK relations 
displayed extremely hostile characteristics. On the other hand, 
after the sanctions against Libya were issued, U.S.-Libya 
relations showed the most amicable atmosphere thus far. 
Libya agreed to the extradition of the two suspects accused of 
involvement in the 1998 Pan Am explosion, and in 2003, 
accepted U.S. demands including taking legal responsibility for 
the explosion and paying compensation individuals (Blanchard 
2009, 5–10). In 2002, the United States called Iran, Iraq, and 
North Korea the “axis of evil” and strongly criticized them as 
countries sponsoring terrorism, but displayed an amicable 
Figure 7: Reference point effects on Libya’s decision-making 
 
* R1: RP before mid-1990s/ R2: RP after mid-1990s 
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attitude in its relations with Libya, which was excluded from the 
group. Under such circumstances, there would have been no 
great difference for North Korea even if it had strongly resisted 
the sanctions. However, if Libya had done so, the amicable 
atmosphere with the United states would have been damaged 
at enormous cost. Thus, this made it relatively difficult for Libya 
to resist the sanctions. Drezner (1997) verified this kind of 
analysis: when a target resisted the sanctions of a sender with 
which it had hostile relations, almost no loss was expected; 
however, very large losses were anticipated under amicable 
relations. Therefore, the more amicable the relations with the 
sender country was, the lower the likelihood of the target 
country resisting the sanctions. 
Secondly, the different decisions made by Libya and North 
Korea following their respective second set of sanctions could 
be seen as a function of whether or not they had allies. It could 
be said that while Libya could not strongly resist the sanctions 
because of its international isolation, North Korea could 
choose to firmly resist because of the presence of China. 
Existing research often argues that resistance to sanctions is 
prolonged where there is external assistance. According to 
Hufbauer et al. (2007, 59), the impact of sanctions on the 
target can be reduced if it can rely on allies to compensate the 
burdens. China could be perceived as an actor that could not 
only simply supply North Korea with the economic capacity to 
resist economic sanctions, but also an actor that could stand 
up to the United States. Moreover, if U.S. sanctions against 
North Korea were to include secondary boycotts, most of the 
targets were likely to be the Chinese companies that had close 
economic relationships with North Korea (KOTRA 2015).7 In 
this case, U.S. sanctions against North Korea would also have 
the characteristic of being sanctions against China. As a result, 
even if North Korea was to resist the U.S. sanctions, it would 
not be easy for the U.S. to implement them. Thus, North Korea 
could firmly resist the sanctions. 
 
 
 
 
 
7 Trade with China accounted for more than 90 
percent of North Korea’s total trade in 2014. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper explores “why each target of economic sanctions 
reacts differently:” that is, “in response to U.S.-led economic 
sanctions, why did North Korea pursue the nuclear path while 
Libya ceased supporting terrorism and refrained from further 
nuclear testing?” This study especially builds a model based 
on RP effects, and analyzes the cases of North Korea and Libya 
utilizing this model. According to the results, when the RP level 
increases, as in the case of North Korea, the target’s losses 
from “backing down” loom larger, and as a result, the target 
resists the economic sanctions more firmly. On the other hand, 
when the RP level decreases, as in the case of Libya, the 
target’s losses incurred from “backing down” are smaller, and 
therefore, the target resists more weakly. 
Theoretically, a risk-seeking decision-maker would prefer to 
resist economic sanctions and a risk-averse decision-maker 
would accept the sanctions. However, in reality, the reaction of 
a target country does not manifest in the dichotomous choice 
of either resistance or acceptance. This is because the actor 
calculates the costs and benefits associated with an economic 
sanction differently, depending on the level of the specific RP. 
Therefore, this paper does not simplify the target country’s 
response to acceptance or resistance but rather, develops a 
model by modifying the regularity of the prospect theory 
inference into a function, examining the decision-making of the 
country targeted by economic sanctions and in the process, 
finding the factors that affect the target’s decision-making. It 
is this aspect that differentiates this research from previous 
discussions on the application of prospect theory. However, 
the limit of this current research is that only the target nation’s 
decision-making is reflected in the model. Therefore, 
developing the model to include both the sender and target 
states will be pursued in further research. 
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Appendix 
I First, a comparison of the expected utilities of settlement and 
contest according to expected utility theory is in order. If the target 
accepts the sender’s demands, it acquires s (0≤s≤1). In this case, 
the probability is 1; therefore, the expected utility becomes s. On the 
other hand, if the target protests against the sanctions and enters into 
a state of contest with the sender, its expected utility equals p×(1-
c)+(1-p)×(0-c). Here, p (0≤p≤1) refers to the probability that the 
target will win in the contest between the two states, and c (0≤c≤1) 
refers to the expected cost entailed in the contest. If the expected 
utility of settlement is greater than that of contest, the target will back 
down; this leads to the conclusion that the economic sanctions have 
proven to be effective. However, if the expected utility of settlement is 
smaller than that of contest, the target will not relent; therefore, it can 
be said that the effectiveness of the sanctions is doubtful. The 
decision of the target here is normally not a dichotomous choice 
between complete settlement and complete resistance. Rather, the 
choice of the target needs to be analyzed in terms of a “level of 
acceptance” or a “level of resistance.” Suppose that there is a 
boundary point, s*, where the preference of choice is indifferent 
because the utilities of the two options are equal. Certainly, s* 
becomes the starting point from which the target begins to back down, 
and at the same time, it becomes the last point from which the target 
decides to stand firm. Therefore, the target’s choice becomes a matter 
of identifying this boundary point, s*. The lower the s*, the point that 
the target regards as acceptable, the more easily the target will back 
down in response to the economic sanctions at hand. 
II According to Butler (2007), the value function (V) and the 
probability weighting function (W) in prospect theory can be described 
through the following functional equations. In this formulation, β 
(0≤β≤1) exhibits diminishing sensitivity, and λ (λ>1) indicates loss 
aversion. Also, α (0≤α≤1) is an exponent reflecting overestimation of 
low probability and underestimation of high probability. 
 
V(x) = x^β (x≥0)       
               = -λ{(-x)^β} (x<0)                     --- (1)                                 
                  W(p) = e^{-(-lnp)^α}                   --- (2) 
 
When the expected utilities (U) of settlement and contest are 
calculated using equations (1) and (2), they are as follows. The 
expected utility is computed by multiplying value and probability, 
where x refers to an amount of gain or loss from the RP, and the 
probability for settlement is 1. Thus, if the target is located in the 
positive (+) domain of (x≥0), the expected utility of settlement is 
formulated as equation (3). On the other hand, if the target is 
positioned in the negative (-) domain of (x<0), the expected utility of 
settlement appears as equation (3′). 
    
U(settlement) = V(x) × W(p) 
                     = (s­R)^β                            --- (3) 
                                     or  = ­λ{(R­s)^β}                     --- (3′) 
 
Likewise, the anticipated expected utility of contest is the sum of 
the utilities of its two possible outcomes: winning and losing. If x1 and 
x2 are the expected values for winning and losing, respectively, then 
the expected utility of contest can be described as equation (4). The 
expected value for losing, x2, is (0-c-R) and is always negative (-); 
however, the expected value for winning, x1, (1-c-R), can be either 
positive (+) or negative (-). Therefore, if x1 is positive (+), the expected 
utility of contest can be written as equation (5). If x1 is negative (-), 
then the equation will be equation (5′).  
 
U(contest) = V(x1) × W(p) + V(x2) × W(1-p)                   ---(4) 
= (1­c­R)^β × e^{­(­lnp)^α} ­ λ(R+c)^β × e^[­{­ln(1­p)}^α]             ---(5) 
or  = ­λ(R+c­1)^β × e^{­(­lnp)^α} ­ λ(R+c)^β × e^[­{­ln(1­p)}^α]    ---(5′) 
 
For the target, relenting means giving something up and generates 
negative (-) utility. Accordingly, the expected utility of settlement can 
only be measured using equation (3′). In theory, the expected utility 
of contest varies depending on whether the expected value when 
predicting a win is positive (+) or negative (-); however, this paper 
assumes that, in general, a target foresees positive (+) expected value 
from winning. If the expected value is positive (+) for the target’s 
anticipation of a win, then the expected utility of contest for this 
decision can be written as equation (5). Accordingly, boundary point, 
s* can be expressed as equation (6) by applying equations (3′) and 
(5).  
 
­λ{(R­s)^β} = (1­c­R)^β × e^{­(­lnp)^α} ­ λ(R+c)^β × e^[­{­ln(1­p)}^α] 
s* = R ­ [(­1/λ) × (1­c­R)^β × e^{­(­lnp)^α} + (R+c)^β × 
 e^{­(­ln(1­p))^α}]^(1/β)                                                              ---(6) 
 
A detailed analysis of equation (6) is called for. When the 
conventional values predicted by prospect theory are substituted for 
each coefficient of equation (6), and under the assumption that p 
and c are fixed, R and s* show a positive correlation as depicted in 
Figure 3. 
                                                           
